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Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 
Contrasting governance learning processes of climate-leading and    
-lagging cities: Portland, Oregon, and Phoenix, Arizona, USA 
Abstract 
 
The contrasting histories and political ecologies of two U.S. cities—Portland Oregon and Phoenix Arizona—shed 
light on their ability to learn from and influence the climate governance of their peers. Portland’s populace, political 
leadership, and business sectors are motivated by environmental and social values , resulting in a collective sense of 
responsibility for fixing global problems like climate change. The city’s  pioneering land-use policies, green 
infrastructure, and multimodal transportation systems solidify its place at the climate action forefront. In contrast, 
libertarian Phoenix prioritizes real estate, efficient government, tourism, and protection of individual rights —the 
antithesis of Portland’s altruism. However, because Phoenix’s economic success depends on reliable supplies of water, 
power, and clean air, it has become an “accidental” expert in dealing with many of the worst effects of climate change: 
drought, heat island, and air pollution. Portland and Phoenix show that cities’ reputations as environmental leaders or 
laggards may not reflect their ability to teach or learn. Rather, opportunities for urban climate governance learning 
depend on affinities between cities’ political-ecological profiles. These examples illustrate how urban lesson-learning 
and policy mobility, originally developed for cases where cities compete, can accelerate around issues like climate 
change, where cities seek to cooperate. 
 




In light of national and state governments’ growing inability to confront the climate crisis, the need for leadership 
by cities has become increasingly urgent (Jayne and Ward, 2017; Parnell, 2016; Sassen, 2012). Equally critical is the 
willingness of cities to learn from each other so that their contributions to climate change mitigation and adaptation 
can keep pace with rising threats. Changes in governing practice are especially important in enabling the required 
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shifts in organization, technology and operations (Bulkeley, 2016). But how does this kind of governance learning 
take place? 
 
In examining two highly contrasting cities in the American West, this paper explores the mechanisms by which 
municipal governments and their polities  adopt lessons from elsewhere. How does such knowledge transfer take place? 
How important are networks, a culture of experimentation, and coordination of levels of governance in implementing  
policies developed by other cities? Do cities prefer to draw on their past experience, or adopt lessons from elsewhere? 
Who do they consider relevant peers  and mentors--their neighbors, with whom they share geographic and political 
affinities, other similar cities elsewhere, or those global centers with the best reputations as success ful innovators?  
How objective are these selections, and how much are they influenced by fashion? 
 
Portland, Oregon and Phoenix, Arizona seem about as different as two American cities can be. Compared to the 
U.S. as a whole, Portland is a politically progressive, socially liberal, ethnically and racially homogeneous, 
communitarian, transit-friendly, climate-policy leader located in a region with abundant rainfall, cool temperatures, 
and clean air. Phoenix in contrast is a politically retrograde, socially libertarian, ethnically polarized, individualistic, 
auto-loving, growth-oriented stronghold of climate change indifference in an extremely arid desert environment 
critically dependent on water management and prone to severe air pollution. For over 100 years, people have moved 
to Portland for its rich natural resources, mild climate, and promised quality of life. Phoenix attracts those seeking to 
escape cold winters and high humidity, make money quickly, and live independently of government influence. Among 
the values that motivate the political establishment in Portland today are creativity, protection of natural capital, and 
attention to social causes. In Phoenix, dominant orientations are economic growth for its own sake, efficient  
management, and the enshrinement of individual rights (Talton, 2015). 
 
These contrasts have a direct effect on how governance has evolved in the two cities, and on their ability to 
influence global efforts to cope with climate change. Because many residents and governments in Metro Portland 
define themselves as environmentally and socially aware, they tend toward the cutting edge of participatory climate 
policymaking. Neighborhood groups, political leaders, and affiliated academics know and readily replicate what their 
counterparts in other forefront cities are trying. In addition, collaboratively preparing and following plans is the norm 
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for Portland’s residents and their leaders. This approach helps them solve policy problems that are too complex for an 
individual organization, increases the transparency of policy-making, and leads to context-appropriate solutions (Sidiki 
et al, 2015; Chu et al, 2016; Kwon et al, 2014). Portland’s governance can thus be characterized as self-reflexive and 
triple loop (Argyris and Schön, 1978) regarding the way policy-making is carried out, evaluated, and revised. 
 
Conversely, Portland’s idealism also contains an anti-scientific streak, with vocal skeptics questioning the benefits 
of science and technology. As an example, Portland is the largest city in the U.S. that does not fluoridate its water, 
because of activists’ concerns that fluoride is a dangerous chemical additive (Freeze and Lehr, 2009). This tendency 
has served as a partial brake on Portland’s  “ecological modernization” (Jänicke, 2007). 
 
Phoenix on the other hand has not generally thought of itself in such environmentally and socially lofty terms. 
Rather it has sought to be in the economic development vanguard that prioritizes opportunities for business, 
entrepreneurship and job creation. Planning has been left to government and business , with only a weak mechanism 
for community input through “village planning committees” (Iwaniec and Wiek, 2014). However, in protecting its 
long-term financial stability, which at a minimum requires a steady supply of water, power, labor, tourists, and 
affordable housing, the city has become an “accidental” climate innovator, particularly regarding water supply and air 
quality. But even though the problems it attempts to solve affect more of the world’s population than those that Portland 
deals with, Phoenix remains below the radar of most scholars of climate change and urban policy  because of its 
overriding conservative reputation. In contrast to Portland, Phoenix’s approach to governance and learning is more 
technocratic (Bäckstrand, 2003), making it potentially more receptive to technical solutions to climate-related  
problems, as long as they aren’t cast in overtly political terms. 
 
The following sections first outline a methodologic framework that examines how the political ecologies, policy 
mobility, and learning modes of Portland and Phoenix help shape their governance responses to climate change. The 
article does not seek or claim empirical generalizability, but points at processes and mechanisms that others may  
uncover elsewhere, albeit not of an exactly similar nature (Payne and Williams, 2005). The paper’s  counter-intuitive 
conclusion is that cities’ reputations as either climate leaders or laggards do not always correlate with their success in 
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communicating the causes and effects of climate change to others, challenging the dominant narrative that leadership 
necessarily translates to being an effective role model. Instead, cities learn best from others with similar profiles.   
 
2.0 Approach and Methodology 
 
The increasing pace of climate change, coupled with the responses shown by a growing number of cities, have 
led to a recent proliferation of research on urban climate governance processes. The current paper seeks to enhance 
this literature by contrasting how two polar opposite U.S. cities teach and learn from others. By incorporating the 
concepts of “lesson drawing” (Rose, 1993), “urban policy mobility” (Baker and Temenos, 2015), and styles of 
learning (Author 1, 2018), it draws conclusions about the conditions needed to accelerate the exchange of climate-
healing information among cities. 
 
Factors that affect how cities learn from each other include the modes used (sequential/parallel, 
open/controlled), the sources involved (endogenous/exogenous), and the resulting depth achieved (single-, double- 
or triple loop) (Author 1, 2018). In addition, meta-learning may occur where such governance knowledge transfer is 
then taken up at other scales. To unpack these traits in studying our two illustrative cities, we need to identify the 
different levels of government and non-state players involved in how they are run, and the particular ways in which 
these levels act and interact. 
 
These assessments of climate governance take place within a framework of urban political ecology, a field 
taking on more salience as the connections between cities and climate change become clearer, and as more of the 
world’s population becomes urban (Heynin et al, 2006). Originally aimed at critiquing the artificial separation of 
society from nature, political ecology later incorporated the biologically-inspired metaphors of urban metabolism 
and circulation to explain how overlapping human and non-human resource flows function and interact in cities 
(Keil, 2003). These principles have been applied to local issues such as solid waste disposal, water supply, and 
urban agriculture (Swyngedouw, 2006). But in describing how individual cities relate to the underlying ecosystems 
on which they depend, urban political ecologists  also strive to undo larger-scale damage caused by the original 
conceptual sin of isolating people from their environment.  
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Urban political ecology’s ability to help restore environmental balance depends on its moving beyond 
individual case studies to the rapid transfer of policy innovations from one city to another. The conditions under 
which this “lesson drawing” (Rose, 1993) and “urban policy mobility” (Baker and Temenos, 2015) work have been 
carefully delineated in a growing body of research and analysis.  These authors have pointed out that lesson-drawing 
from a city’s past or from its peers works best when several conditions are met: the scale of policy intervention to be 
borrowed should be relatively small, the cause-effect relationship between the policy change and the resultant 
outcome should be clear, there should be strong interdependence with other existing programs, and, most 
importantly, there should be a congruity of values between the source city and the learning city. This last condition 
means that cities like Portland and Phoenix tend to look elsewhere for role models. 
 
Rose’s (1993) original formulation of lesson drawing was based on applications , perceived to be zero-sum, in 
which cities were competing against each other for economic development gains.  The same is true for many 
examples of urban policy mobility (Baker and Temenos, 2015), such as studies of the transfer of Business 
Improvement Districts from the U.S. to the U.K. (Ward, 2006; Cook, 2008), or considerations of how creativity 
migrates from one country to another (Cohen, 2015).  In contrast, when cities take on climate change, or a host of 
other environmental issues, the motivation is  commonly less competitive; the goal instead is cooperation to achieve 
a global environmental outcome. Enhancing urban political ecology with the lesson-drawing paradigm offers the 
promise of powerfully accelerating policy transfer. Some of the enabling factors identified in earlier papers about 
policy mobility, like transnational networks, or tabulated examples (Broto  and Bulkeley, 2013) are particularly 
relevant here. 
 
The current case study design assumes that insights from an in-depth qualitative analysis of governance learning 
dynamics in Portland and Phoenix can offer lessons that apply to a wide range of urban realities, both inside and 
outside the U.S. This ‘critical case’ approach serves primarily to generate new theory and practical knowledge for its 
application (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Donmoyer, 2000), but also to validate existing theory (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). The 
patterns and processes observed can thus inform more general interpretations regarding urban climate governance 
learning and allow implications for research and policy to be derived. 
 6 
 
For data collection, an analysis of pertinent policy documents and press publication s has been performed, as well 
as semi-structured interviews with 22 key individuals. Prominent among these were Susan Anderson (Director, 
Portland Bureau of Planning and Sustainability), Grady Gammage Jr (real estate attorney and historian of Phoenix), 
and Rob Melnick (Arizona State University Professor and Director for 25 years of the leading policy institute in 
Phoenix).  Transcribed interviews were coded according to the above framework for interpretation. In addition, the 
author has case knowledge based on professional engagement as a university administrator and researcher of urban 
climate-related policy-making in both cities over more than 20 years. 
 
3.0 Portland Case Study: The Emergence of a “Natural” Climate Leader 
 
In the 1960s, Portland was one of the most polluted and unins piring cities in the Western US. Natural resource 
extraction and metals manufacturing, two of the dominant local industrial sectors, contaminated the city’s air and its 
two major rivers, the Columbia and Willamette. Downtown Portland was experiencing the same hollowing out and 
suburban flight found throughout much of the country, spurred by plans for a web of new freeways and relatively  
affordable, outlying subdivisions. New commercial construction in the city was utilitarian, efficient, and dull.  
 
Now, fifty years later, Portland is hailed as a model for sustainable transit-oriented development (Hagerman , 
2007). Commuting rates by cycling and transit are among the highest in the U.S. (Bloomberg and Pope, 2017). 
Downtown Portland is a Mecca of walk-able and bike-able neighborhoods, restaurants, and parks, filled with 
historically-preserved and energy-efficient buildings. Natural storm water infrastructure like bioswales and green 
roofs has reduced government outlays for pipes and pumps. Tilikum Crossing, the newest span over the Willamette, 
symbolizes the local ethos by carrying pedestrians, bikes, buses, streetcars and light rail—but no cars or trucks. 
Although Portland has historically been lacking in racial and ethnic diversity, its policy-makers today try to assure 
that environmental and social benefits are more equitably distributed. 
 
3.1 Multilevel and Multisector Coordination of Climate Change Response 
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The key factor to understanding Portland’s  idealistic approach to climate change is the coordinated and consistent 
nature of federal, state, and municipal government actions over more than 40 years, coupled with reinforcing steps 
taken by the private sector, regulated utilities, and academia.  
 
In the late 1960s, Oregon Governor Tom McCall and state legislators developed a comprehensive set of planning 
regulations for the agricultural and urban parts of the state, in order to stop the spread of cities into Oregon’s fertile 
Willamette Valley. These set growth boundaries around all of Oregon’s cities , and created Metro, Portland’s elected 
regional government, charged with managing land use inside and outside the region’s urban growth boundary (UGB). 
After more than 40 years, Metro and Portland’s UGB remain the only such state-created policy tools in the U.S. 
(Abbott, 2004). 
 
Portland City government, backed by community activists  and non-profits, has also been a policy pioneer. When 
the Federal Highway Administration sought to slice up the city’s neighborhoods with a network of new freeways in 
the 1970s, the city council and mayor, along with citizen’s groups and Oregon’s congressional delegation, teamed up 
to protest. Using recently-passed federal legislation, the city shifted highway funds to construct the nation’s first 
modern light rail system. Transit, cycling, and zoning that encouraged small, walkable blocks and coherent 
neighborhoods, facilitated the density needed to support the UGB. 
 
In the 1990s, Portland residents were among the first in the country to heed warnings from climate scientists about 
the long-term dangers of global warming. Connections among reduced CO2, non-automotive methods of mobility , 
energy-efficient construction, and city design fit with the region’s prevailing attitudes . The result was the creation and 
enactment in 1993 of the country’s first Climate Action Plan (CAP) (City of Portland, 1993). The project, led by the 
city’s Bureau of Planning and Sustainability (BPS), garnered support from a succession of mayors and city councils. 
Initially viewed as a largely symbolic gesture, the climate-related policies of Portland and other cities took on greater 
importance as deniers of climate change blocked federal efforts to reduce emissions (Dunlap and McCright, 2008). 
The CAP has become one of the Portland region’s primary planning instruments, with widespread citizen, corporate, 
and NGO involvement in the production of its periodic updates (City of Portland and Multnomah County, 2015). 
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Federal resources and legislation have supported many of Oregon’s and Portland’s climate-related policy 
innovations. Interstate highway funds paid most of the costs of constructing a downtown expressway loop, which took 
truck traffic off city streets , making the city more pedestrian- and bike-friendly.  More recently, the Oregon 
congressional delegation helped secure funding for Tilikum Crossing and other additions to Portland’s mass transit 
system. The Obama Administration’s implementation of climate-enhancing policies provided federal reinforcement  
of Portland’s leadership. 
 
The construction, architecture, design, and real estate industries, seeing opportunities to profit from Portland’s 
emerging “green” brand, strongly supported the CAP’s call for increased energy efficiency of buildings. The city and 
these partners launched a “We Build Green Cities” campaign (Greater Portland Inc, 2015), marketing Portland’s green 
innovations worldwide. Similarly, a utility- and academic-led movement to promote electric vehicles in the early 
2010s evolved into a broad, regional effort to turn Metro Portland into a “smart city” testbed, which has gained 
recognition from high-tech companies and federal agencies. 
 
3.2 Scaling and Transferring Portland’s Climate Lessons 
 
Portland’s multi-scale, bottom-up approach to climate action (Corfee-Morlot, 2009) has many components . 
Engaged neighborhood members encourage each other and their city officials to make it easier to walk, bicycle, take 
transit, and recycle. Local groups emphasizing social priorities assure that equity issues remain part of climate 
discussions. Multi-city organizations like Metro regional government and TriMet transit authority help synthesize and 
align the views of the region’s many cities. 
 
Portland State University (PSU) is one of many public-sector players that help local governments fulfill their 
climate mitigation responsibilities and adaptation preparations. For example, the Portland Climate Action 
Collaborative (Beaudoin and Sherman, 2016) allows Portland’s BPS to prioritize Climate Action Plan research 
questions, which PSU faculty and students then help answer. This approach is now being replicated by philanthropies 
and city-university consortia, illustrating the benefits of universities accommodating municipal partners’ needs , rather 
than expecting cities to adjust to the peculiarities of academic culture. 
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Beyond their metropolitan confines, Portland’s  officials have long collaborated with their counterparts in cities 
with similar outlooks, through groups such as ICLEI (Elert, 2016) and the Urban Sustainability Directors’ Network. 
Because of its innovative reputation, Portland was invited into the influential C40 network, despite being below that 
group’s normal population threshold. Planners, politicians, and NGOs from Scandinavia, Asia, and Australia frequent 
the city to borrow, replicate, and enhance its most progressive ideas, comfortable with the environmentally-sensitive 
values they encounter. 
 
Portland illustrates how multiple levels of government can reinforce each other’s willingness to experiment to 
achieve goals developed in consultation with grass -roots organizations, universities and the private sector. Progressive 
policies encourage in-migration by civic-oriented individuals, who in turn elect more like-minded officials and support 
sympathetic NGOs, which can develop yet more inclusive and participatory approaches to governance, promote cross-
domain knowledge transfer, embrace openness and parallel learning processes, and thereby question long -established 
forms of governing. The formal and informal multi-sector collaboration around climate change mitigation, which 
integrates input from an unusually large cast of players, is a prime example of this innovation. 
 
On the other hand, creative constituencies moving into Portland’s socially- and environmentally-aware milieu , 
along with idealistic long-time neighborhood activists, have in the past tended toward insularity, focusing on the 
qualities of place while downplaying the importance of outreach to their counterparts in other cities (including the 
more conservative communities many of them came from). This inclination reinforces the view that climate mitigation  
is an elitist concern, limiting the ability of cities like Portland to serve as effective role models. This inward-looking  
trend has been countered by the long-term tenure of many non-elected city officials , who have found ways to coax 
mayors and city councils to maintain commitments to reducing carbon emissions and reaching equity goals. This 
group of experienced bureaucrats has also driven Portland’s network participation, resulting in its reputation as a 
global climate leader. 
 
This apparent contradiction regarding Portland’s willingness to influence the climate governance of other cities 
highlights the contrasting roles of different actors. Municipal workers and their NGO and academic partners lay the 
foundations for climate leadership that eventually get accepted and promoted by more cautious political and industry 
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leaders. Policy mobility and lesson drawing are easier within Metro Portland; the cities learn more readily from their 
neighbors and from their past experience than they do from cities elsewhere. 
 
4.0 Phoenix Case Study: The Formation of an Inadvertent Climate Leader 
 
In the desert city of Phoenix, climate change is the elephant in the room, an existential threat that has only 
reluctantly been acknowledged. Arizona’s libertarian politics are antithetical to the idea that one region would take 
responsibility for “fixing” such a global problem. Admitting climate risks runs counter to the interests of the “real 
estate – industrial complex” (Talton, 2015), and is thus downplayed by local governments and business associations. 
Only recently have modest climate action plans been launched, at the state level in 2006 and in Phoenix in 2009. In 
contrast to Portland, community input was restricted, reflecting Phoenix’s tendency toward top-down governance. 
 
Throughout this period, city officials were accumulating practical expertise about ways to address chronic water 
shortages, particulate air pollution compounded by desert dust, and the urban heat island effect, all of which are highly 
relevant to how other parts of the world adjust to climate change. Thus, instead of zeroing in on its weak articulation 
of “climate change” governance, we next consider how Phoenix has in fact addressed concerns about water and power 
supply, motivated by a desire to maintain its growth-based economy. 
 
4.1 The Role of Multiple Levels of Government in Water Management 
 
The water management establishment in Phoenix consists of a complex web of public and private sector players 
(Gammage, 2016). Originally dominated by agricultural interests, the network now also includes real estate 
developers, city officials, and electric utilities  (Talton, 2015). One of its bedrock principles has been that water should 
be kept cheap, whenever possible subsidized by the Federal Government. The artificially low price of water has 




As in Portland, municipal initiatives in Phoenix have been strongly influenced by state and federal actions. 
Beginning in 1922, the seven states bordering the Colorado River negotiated a compact for distributing the basin’s 
shared water resource. Only decades later did hydrologists and climatologists determine that the earlier calculations 
of total availability were inflated by anomalously high flows, meaning that the Colorado River would be unable to 
meet the region’s long-term demands, even without a changing climate (Christensen et al., 2004). When Arizona 
signed the agreement in 1944, it was allocated more water than its small cities and farm communities needed. 
However, over the next 30 years, rapid urban growth and expansion of agriculture caused the region’s groundwater 
table to fall alarmingly fast. Phoenix also has had access to water from reservoirs on the Verde and Salt Rivers north 
and east of the city, originally constructed by the Federal government to produce hydropower and support agriculture. 
But by the 1960s, it became clear that these existing sources would be insufficient to accommodate anticipated 
population growth, requiring that the Colorado River be directly tapped. 
 
Between 1973 and 1993, the U.S. Government paid most of the costs for constructing the 541-km Central Arizona 
Project aqueduct, which brought Colorado River water to Phoenix and Tucson (Grimm and Redman, 2004). However, 
federal funding came with the stipulation that Arizona require any new real estate development to have an assured 
100-year supply of water, codified in the comprehensive Groundwater Management Act of 1980. The act created the 
Arizona Department of Water Resources , which was mandated to develop plans for quantifying, storing and moving 
water within four Active Management Areas  in basins associated with the rapidly urbanizing parts of the state. Since 
completing the Central Arizona Project, and as a result of federal requirements, Arizona has become a recognized 
innovator in water management, deriving novel ways to clean, store, mix, and move a combination of municipal and 
agricultural effluent, ground water, and surface water from the Colorado, Verde, and Salt River watersheds. This 
experience, which unintentionally also contributed to increased resilience against future climate change impacts, made 
Arizona a hotbed for new ideas about coping with water shortages, linking it with Israel, Australia, and China. 
 
Because Arizona’s state and federal legislators  are today dominated by politicians who publicly reject the reality  
of human-influenced climate change, they resist actions explicitly intended to make the state more resilient to global 
warming. However, these same leaders readily accept the need for water conservation as a precaution against the 
periodic droughts that preceded any anthropogenic influences . Similarly, the need for strategies to reduce the urban 
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heat island in Tucson and Phoenix has been justified by a desire to avoid power shortages and utility rate increases, 
which both could threaten real estate development and tourism, rather than due to fears of increased temperatures due 
to climate change. While focusing on non-climate explanations for variations in water supply and heat has local 
political benefits, it has the drawback of limiting the audiences that choose to learn from Phoenix’s water management  
expertise. The city has been sidelined as irrelevant in many climate change discussions where they could potentially 
have a major impact. For instance, global consortia like the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group and the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s “100 Resilient Cities” invite the participation of innovative places like Portland, rather than Phoenix, 
despite the latter’s much greater size. 
 
4.2 The Water-Energy Nexus and the Role of the Utility Sector in Phoenix 
 
Just behind water as a critical necessity for urban desert dwellers comes air conditioning and the energy required 
to generate it. Much of the water that Arizona manages is intimately tied to the generation and consumption of 
electricity, especially by Phoenix. At the same time, much of the electricity produced in Arizona is used to pump 
groundwater to the surface and move surface water uphill, either for municipal uses or to cool power plants  (Scott et 
al, 2011). Nearly all climate change models show water becoming scarcer in Arizona; the unwillingness of many 
politicians to acknowledge this reality threatens the state’s long -term viability (Ross, 2011). However, these same 
individuals will readily discuss power generation, offering a surreptitious way for state policy to incorporate climate 
projections, and even to reduce carbon emissions . 
 
Nearly 30% of Arizona’s power comes from the Palo Verde nuclear generating facility, the country’s largest, 
located 80 km west of downtown Phoenix. Palo Verde is the only nuclear plant in the world not built adjacent to a 
large water body. It annually consumes 20 billion gallons of recycled municipal wastewater, collected from Phoenix 
and half a dozen neighboring cities (Golden, 2004). Treating and transporting this water also uses large amounts of 
energy. Most of the rest of Phoenix’s electricity comes from coal and natural gas facilities far from the city. One of 
the coal-fired plants, the Navajo generating station, requires up to 8 billion gallons of Lake Powell water per year for 
cooling. While these coal- and gas-burning plants are major contributors to Arizona’s greenhouse gas emissions, 
consumers in Phoenix have been much less concerned about their carbon footprints than residents of Portland. 
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However, if told that future water scarcity may shut the power plants needed to maintain air conditioning, Phoenicians 
might be more willing to conserve both water and power. 
 
The obvious missing element in this discussion is renewable energy, given that Arizona has some of the most 
abundant solar resources in the U.S. The state was relatively slow to develop its solar potential, partly because of the 
availability of nuclear, coal, and natural gas  generation, and partly because legislators and utilities opposed public 
support for green energy at the expense of utility profits . Arizona’s adoption of residential rooftop solar lagged behind 
cloudier New Jersey and Germany. On the other hand, Arizona has long been a center for solar technology research, 
led by partnerships between the same utilities , Arizona State University (ASU), the U.S. Department of Energy, and 
private energy companies (Fink, 2011). The steep drop in the cost of photovoltaic cells, panels, and storage means 
that unsubsidized solar will soon be fully cost-competitive with carbon-based power in Arizona. Solar energy exported 
from Arizona could then become a major contributor to reducing U.S. carbon emissions, but only after substantial 
investments in enhanced interstate transmission. 
 
Ironically, through access to power generated by nuclear, solar, and hydro, Phoenix residents have relatively low 
per capita carbon emissions, even though that has been much less of a civic priority than in cities like Portland. Carbon-
free nuclear power like that at Palo Verde requires major public subsidies for construction, eventual decommissioning 
and disposal of the materials that make up the facilities, and site security. Despite their attractiveness from a carbon 
standpoint, building of new nuclear plants seems unlikely because of political opposition, long-term environmental 
concerns, and an unwillingness of financial institutions and the federal government to fund risky investments. 
 
Ultimately, reduction in the reliability of Arizona’s already-stressed water supplies due to climate change will 
favor a shift from coal, nuclear, and hydropower to natural gas, s olar and wind. In contrast to Portland, where a sense 
of collective responsibility coupled with municipal government leadership support a transition to renewable energy, 
mass transit, and denser urban form, in Phoenix, more carbon-responsible policies and practice will likely be forced 
on the city by climate-related threats to the water and power supplies. 
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Because environmental and social awareness and knowledge are more narrowly distributed in Phoenix than in 
Portland, the public’s  degree of engagement and interaction with government officials is also considerably less. The 
dynamic interplay among different levels of government and civic groups, which shapes Portland’s climate strategy, 
is also lacking. It is replaced by highly influential statewide boards that oversee how Phoenix deals with water and 
power, the most important controls on the city’s  ability to thrive in the face of climate change.  
 
The elected Central Arizona Project board determines how water is distributed throughout much of the state. Its 
15 commissioners influence not only water use, but also energy consumption, real estate development, agriculture, 
and protection of natural areas. Board members’ policy views  reflect Arizonans’ opinions about a range of contentious 
issues including climate change and urbanization (Loomis, 2016). Recent Boards have included technically-proficien t  
members with relatively moderate positions. The Project board serves as the primary public forum in which climate-
related policy matters are assessed, a role that in Portland is played more visibly by the City Council and various 
neighborhood groups and non-profits. 
 
The Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC), the state’s public utility commission, regulates non-municipal 
utilities. When originally set up, it was made an elected rather than appointed body out of concern that corporations 
would exert too much control on commissioners directly appointed by a Governor. However, the ACC has recently 
been made up of Republicans who support the state’s largest utility in pushing to reduce the Renewable Portfolio  
Standard (RPS), arguing that it unfairly subsidizes some consumers’ rates (Stockmayer et al., 2011). The RPS 
determines how much utilities pay consumers for solar energy generated from their rooftops and has a major impact  
on the state’s greenhouse gas emissions . As a reflection of the ACC’s political orientation, in the 2016 election, four 
of the five Republican candidates denied any human influence on climate change. 
  
These two regulatory bodies set much of the climate-related policy in Arizona. The interplay between their roles 
in controlling water use and power generation takes place largely out of public view, in contrast to the very visible 
debates that influence climate mitigation in Portland. This lack of transparency, and politicized positions like the 
ACC’s , contribute to Phoenix’s reputation as a city characterized by climate change denial. This reputation, in turn, 
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is why cities like Portland don’t acknowledge Phoenix’s expertise in dealing with water and energy shortages , and its 
potential as a source of lesson learning. 
 
4.3 Top-Down Policy-Making and Transferability of Climate Governance Lessons from Phoenix 
 
The political ecology of Phoenix, which attracts individuals seeking independence from government influence, 
favors top-down environmental policy-making led by government officials and business leaders, rather than the 
participatory decision-making seen in Portland (Fraser et al., 2006). This tendency has been reinforced in Phoenix by 
good management. The city was consistently ranked as best-run in the U.S. through the 1990s and 2000s (Denhardt 
and Denhardt, 2001). As a result, Phoenix enacts policies with less debate, little altered from what is worked out by 
the City Council and private sector. This simpler pathway makes Phoenix conducive to more rapid, sequential, single -
loop learning about climate change than what is found in Portland. The rich debates that precede Portland’s p rogram 
formulation reveal new ideas, one reason it is seen as an environmental policy incubator. But Phoenix’s  municipal 
government, with its emphasis on efficiency and service to the public , also showcases ways to deliver on climate 
commitments once the city agrees to them. The Phoenix strategy of outsourcing to professionals, rather than 
replicating expertise within the government (Kettl, 2000) favors collaboration with outside organizations, in this case 
with ASU and environmental consulting firms. 
 
5.0 Discussion: Climate Governance Learning Characteristics of Portland and Phoenix  
 
Portland and Phoenix approach climate change in very different ways that reflect their highly contrasting histories 
and cultures. In this section we look at how the political ecologies of these two cities affect how they are able to learn 
from and teach other cities about climate change.  
 
Portland’s most progressive attributes today trace back to Oregon’s decision in the 1970s to create urban growth 
boundaries around its cities. This and steps that followed gave the region a distinctive pro-environment, populist stamp 
that attracted individuals and companies who would support similar forward-thinking ideas and positions. This 
demographic feedback meant that city officials could depend on knowledgeable residents , as well as workers in other 
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municipal departments, to take action to support the community values that originally drew them to the region. Thus, 
new ideas about climate or other environmental topics  could be developed by many players acting in concert. This 
parallel learning mode extended to the export of local ideas: well-connected individuals and organizations used their 
networks to inform and advise colleagues in other cities about the pros and cons of Portland’s programs and policies. 
 
In contrast, early ranchers and farmers attracted to central Arizona’s cheap land and sunshine most valued 
individualism and a lack of government interference. However, growth in Phoenix’s harsh desert setting required 
collective responses like major investments in infrastructure for water and power. The unforgiving heat and lack of 
water meant Phoenicians had to learn quickly how to cope in order to survive. Residents relied on experts and efficient  
government to supply basic services  and to network with other fast-growing desert cities, rather than participating in 
governance themselves, freeing them to concentrate on business development. Because of the lack of broad-based 
public engagement, serial problem-solving has taken place in relatively narrow circles by department workers , 
consultants, and boards. The main countervailing influence has come from academic partners at ASU, who were 
experts at working across disciplines. The cumulative result has been sequential and controlled modes of learning 
carried out largely by municipal government with little external input. Climate change, per se, was a topic that Phoenix 
city officials long avoided tackling directly, not just because of political aversion, but also because it was seen as a 
distraction from their core functions. 
 
The main exception to this characterization has been water policy, where Phoenix and Arizona as a whole are 
widely-recognized innovators. Because reliable water provision is an essential requirement for economic  
development, it has received a great deal of non-controversial attention. For instance, there is considerable 
understanding in Phoenix of hydrologic uncertainty, but it is described in terms of periodic persistent drought, not 
climate change. Since drought is generally considered to be independent of human actions, Arizona’s experience with 
water shortage provides little basis for talking about mitigation  strategies. Thus, where activist cities like Portland 
readily discuss climate change alleviation as well as adaptation, Phoenix mainly addresses the latter.  
 
Nonetheless, Phoenix’s extensive knowledge of how to measure and respond to water shortages offers an 
opportunity for the city to learn in a parallel way about climate change. Different departments within city and state 
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government, offices within regulatory organizations, consulting firms and NGOs all contribute to interpretations of 
how water supplies are being affected by persistently increasing temperatures, changes in land-use, and the frequency 
and intensity of storms. This part of Phoenix’s learning is open in the sense that different bureaus and sectors can be 
involved; in contrast to Portland, the public rarely participates, either as individuals or as neighborhoods. 
 
These contrasts also extend to how the two cities exchange information with their peers . To implement its Climate 
Action Plan, Portland takes a broad view, looking at all aspects of city operations that affect carbon emissions. 
Portland’s civic leaders and their partners frequently present at national and international forums, exposing them to 
the latest global perspectives  and providing opportunities for exogenous learning about all aspects of climate change. 
Historically Portland has been focused more on climate policy than on technology, although recent efforts to compete 
for federal “smart city” grants have raised awareness of the potential benefits  of ubiquitous, distributed sensors. 
Portland is also emerging as a center of both public and private sector innovation in electric and low-speed autonomous 
vehicles. This endogenous technological learning, partly within government, not only addresses critical local problems 
but also generates economic development and licensing revenue. 
 
Because Phoenix has fewer staff focusing on climate change, it is less able to learn about policy developments 
elsewhere. As a result, its knowledge, endogenously gained by overextended workers, is inherently limited. Here 
again, water is the exception. Private sector and academic environmental engineers, working with city water bureaus, 
develop new devices and software related to desalinization, soil moisture, hydroponics, and water pumping. 
Companies and academics from the Middle East and Aus tralia exchange ideas about water-related R&D with their 
counterparts in Arizona (e.g., Megdal, 2017), providing opportunities for exogenous learning. 
 
Portland and Phoenix also differ in the depth of their climate change learning, as seen in their use of single-, 
double-, or triple-loop approaches . As we’ve discussed, climate change can affect cities  in many ways: increased 
droughts, floods, urban heat island effects, air pollution, sea level rise, aquifer declines, blackouts, disease breakouts, 
and forest fires. Single-loop responses to these phenomena are simply reactive: purchase more air conditioners when 
temperatures rise; tell people to stay indoors if air quality declines; lower reservoir levels as storms near. Both cities 
keep these approaches in their arsenals, although their use does little to avoid or prevent the next crisis. Thanks to the 
 18 
focus on efficiency by its well-run bureaucracy, Phoenix handles these activities well and can serve as a role model. 
Ironically, the idealism of some in Portland might get in the way of deploying pragmatic short-term solutions like 
expanding air conditioning, because of concerns that these adaptive actions do not adequately address underlying, 
longer-term problems like climate change. 
 
Double-loop reactions to climate change involve “adjusting the rules” that caused the problems. In Phoenix, these 
could include planting more trees and installing shade structures to reduce the intensity of heat island episodes; using 
permeable pavement in parking lots to reduce runoff and restore depleted urban aquifers; and paying residents to 
convert their lawns into desert landscaping. These steps, pioneered by other desert cities , have only recently come to 
Phoenix and its neighbors. The costliest response to the threat of drought has been the increasing dependence on 
Central Arizona Project water. 
 
Portland’s double-loop actions include extensive use of bioswales, planted roofs, and other green infrastructure 
to reduce runoff and restore aquifers ; subsidization of the installation of residential insulation and solar panels to 
increase resilience to power shortages; and identification of more emergency shelters for homeless populations to use 
during increasingly common heat waves. As with all aspects of Port land’s policy development, these activities include 
considerable public input. 
 
It is in the realm of triple-loop learning about climate change where Phoenix and Portland differ most 
dramatically. Described in shorthand as “learning about learning,” this mode involves reflection about the underlying 
conditions that cause a problem, and consideration of whether or not the right problem is being addressed. For the 
present case, a city’s triple-loop response could involve altering the behaviors  that cause the climate to change in the 
first place. These actions can be individual or institutional. Because Phoenix does not consider climate change 
mitigation to be its responsibility, nearly all of its focus is on adaptation, with its learning limited to single- and double-
loop types. In contrast, Portland was the first city with a climate action plan, which by definition is a triple-loop 
activity, in that it seeks to fix an underlying problem outside the jurisdiction of its residents. 
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As its propensity for triple-loop learning demonstrates, one of the signature characteristics of Portland’s 
governance is a non-hierarchical distribution of expertise. Thus, many new ideas come neither from the public nor 
their leaders, but rather from mid-level government technocrats with uncommonly long tenure in municipal agencies 
and strong networks with colleagues in other cities and in universities. For the case of climate change, this can lead to 
parallel learning processes, as different bureaus (Planning and Sustainability, Housing, Transportation, Environmental 
Services) simultaneously try new approaches within their immediate purviews that all advan ce community goals laid  
out in documents like the Climate Action Plan. Similarly, this flat structure alters the role of academic collaborators; 
they can more equally co-produce new knowledge about climate change mitigation with their city partners than wo uld 
be the case if the information exchange were more narrow or unidirectional. In Portland, interdisciplinarity, an 
obligatory hallmark of the academic study of cities, comes as much from the partnerships cultivated by scholars as 
from the university researchers themselves. Finally, the professional longevity of many of Portland’s managers leads 
to more endogenous, sequential learning, because these individuals remember past successes and problems and can 
adjust their actions accordingly. 
 
While for many cities the arrival of climate change offered a completely new set of challenges, for Phoenix, they 
were already quite familiar. The mechanisms earlier put in place to make the city livable (and to support its real estate 
interests) were similar to those required for dealing with a world that was suddenly seen to be heating up and drying 
out. Therefore, from a technical standpoint, Phoenix has many lessons to offer other cities about climate resilience, 
long-term planning, water and energy conservation, and the migration of refugees, all in the context of climate change. 
Its pragmatic, pro-business, individualistic orientation contrasts with the more collectivist attitudes that characterize 
Portland, making it relatively straightforward to come to a political consensus. However, these attractive attributes 
have been sullied by the emergence of a radically conservative political agenda at state and local levels, which rejects 
the idea of an anthropogenic cause for climate change. This movement, which predates th e similar national trend, 
makes many other cities reluctant to look to Phoenix as a climate change role model, hindering lesson drawing and 





A comparison of Portland and Phoenix illustrates some of the opportunities and challenges cities face in achieving 
the knowledge transfer necessary to address climate change. In Portland, governance learning involves a combination 
of parallel and experimental modes  that draw on both endogenous and exogenous sources. Endogenous influences 
include a range of local climate stakeholders; exogenous inputs come from other policy fields and other jurisdictions  
through extensive networks and interdisciplinary, multisector collaborations. Climate-related governance in Portland 
evolves through a combination of double- and triple-loop learning activities, which change the institutions as well as 
their practices. The most prominent triple-loop example is the city’s Climate Action Plan, through which it implicit ly  
and explicitly takes responsibility for societal problems  well beyond its jurisdiction. 
 
In Phoenix, governance learning about climate is based on sequential and controlled modes, which draw on 
endogenous assessments from a limited pool of local experts  and outside contacts, resulting in mostly single-loop 
learning that addresses specific local problems like heat island mitigation. The main exception is in water policy, 
where Phoenix has, of necessity, developed deep proficiency and a global network of peers . In this one climate-
relevant domain, Phoenix has double-loop learning with parallel input from multiple city, county, and state 
departments, as well as regulatory agencies. 
 
In both cities, local universities play a critical role in knowledge provision  and leadership. PSU is one of many 
public-sector partners that help Portland fulfill its climate mitigation responsibilities  and adaptation preparations , 
contributing to the city’s pervasive parallel learning approach. In contrast, ASU today is the most significant 
formulator of economic development and environmental policy in Phoenix. As the city’s  dominant intermediary, ASU 
provides both theoretical and practical knowledge about climate change, as well as access to external networks. 
Phoenix thus has sequential learning from a single external source (ASU), rather than from its own staff. Here again, 
water is the exception. In addition to university input about water quality and supply, Phoenix can draw on more than 
a century of experience coping with the uncertainty of water availability. Parallel learning across city, county, and 
state departments, coupled with private sector and federal agency input, give Phoenix a solid foundation on which to 
deal with the water implications of such climate change-related risks as flooding, urban heat, and power disruptions. 
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Oregon’s natural abundance and mild setting mean that the climate-related problems Portland confronts, like 
increased heat island and risk of seasonal drought, flooding, or fires, are less pressing than those dealt with in 
physically harsher places. In addition, because of less local urgency, climate mitigation and adaptation tend to have a 
lower priority than issues like housing affordability and seismic preparedness. Hence, for cities facing immediate 
threats of drought, air pollution, or sea-level rise, Portland is a less obvious role model. Finally, Portland’s status 
among climate mitigation elites may intimidate less advanced cities. 
 
If cities are going to borrow ideas  from elsewhere, they should come from places or networks that local 
stakeholders know and respect as familiar peers or peer-aspirants. Thus, cities like Portland will most readily try 
approaches developed in places at similar stages of environmental, social, and economic awareness, like its fellow 
Cascadian cities of Seattle and Vancouver. The benefits of this kind of policy mobility have been widely referenced 
but achieving them in practice is challenging due to limited municipal staff time and expertise. City officials are 
responsible for making their jurisdictions function well, not for “saving the world.” Until new mechanisms can funnel 
resources to cities for fulfilling this altruistic role, their efforts will not be economically sustainable. Philanthropies 
have begun to facilitate this transformation, but ultimately, national governments are the only players with sufficient 
resources to let cities realize their potential as climate change champions. 
 
In some ways, these two cities provide windows into the past and the future of urban -based climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, and thus different scenarios for policy mobility. With an abundance of reasonably-priced 
water and carbon-free power, Portland’s residents have to work harder to translate their governance lessons into forms 
that can also help others outside of their benign bubble. As the global climate crisis gets more extreme, fewer and 
fewer cities will have the policy leeway that has blessed Portland. Instead, they will have to choose the least bad 
among unappealing options. Because of its geographic setting and realpolitik, Phoenix is better prepared to 
immediately advise the growing numbers of climate change victims, if it decides this is a priority, and if it can get 
their attention. Portland and Phoenix illustrate how cities’ reputations, either as global leaders or as experts in 
particular domains, do not necessarily make them effective sources of climate-related policy mobility. Governance 
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